Introduction
In areas where the state fails to provide collective services, external actors may step up and fill the gap (Krasner and Risse 2012) . This paper considers the activities of multinational corporations (MNCs) in this respect. MNCs are external actors least likely to provide collective services in areas of limited statehood. As profit driven, private actors, they do not have a genuine interest in the common good.
i Yet, some of them adhere to standards of corporate social responsibility and make attempts to contribute to collective services (Börzel and Thauer 2013; Flanagan 2006; Flohr, Rieth, Schwindenhammer and Wolf 2010; Mol 2001; Vogel and Kagan 2004) . The literature on governance and (self-) regulation, voluntary standards and corporate social responsibility has so far mainly focused on explaining such attempts (Boerzel, Héritier, Kranz and Thauer 2011; Greenhill, Mosley and Prakash 2009; Prakash and Potoski 2006; Smith 2008; Spar and LaMure 2003; Thauer 2010 and 2014) . This paper analyzes an aspect that has not been looked at much yet (Blowfield 2007) : the effectiveness of attempts by external business actors to contribute to service provision in areas of limited statehood. Under which conditions do multinational corporations effectively contribute to service provision?
Addressing this question, this paper assumes limited statehood, and that service provision is a complex task. By areas of limited statehood it understands spaces in which governments lack the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions and/or in which the legitimate monopoly over the means of violence is lacking (Krasner and Risse 2012; Risse 2011 ). This ability can be restricted along different dimensions, such as territorial or with regard to specific policy areas (Draude, Risse and Schmelzle 2012: 11) . Task complexity refers to the number of specific interventions required for successful service provision and the number of actors or entities that must be coordinated to administer these interventions (Krasner and Risse 2012; Perrow 1972; Schäferhoff in this volume) . The more complex a task, the more actors must be coordinated by the MNC and consequently, the higher is the likelihood of coordination failure and ineffectiveness of service provision. Complex tasks are therefore hard cases for effective service provision. The complex tasks this paper specifically looks at are the fight against HIV/AIDS and public security provision. It investigates firm programs in these two domains that take place in a context of limited statehood. Specifically it examines multinationals in the This paper makes two arguments: firstly, attempts by MNCs to contribute to service provision must be legitimate to be effective. We concentrate on a specific aspect of legitimacy that we consider crucial: the conformity of norms held by those actors and entities that must be coordinated to deliver services, with the international norms on the basis of which MNCs act (Checkel 1999; Krasner and Risse 2012) . Such congruence is a necessary condition for effective contributions to public service delivery by MNCs. However, legitimacy alone does not guarantee service provision. The institutional design -more specifically, the degree of institutionalization -of the programs that aim at service provision is, secondly, an important factor for effectiveness (Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter and Snidal 2000) .
Institutionalization pertains to the degree to which a service provision program can draw on organizational structures that provide for monitoring and incentives for the achievement of program goals, and to the degree to which these goals are formulated concisely and obligatory (Krasner and Risse 2012) . Everything else being equal, highly institutionalized programs are more effective than weakly institutionalized ones.
In what follows, the paper first lays out the arguments on legitimacy and institutional design, and how they will be assessed. It then conducts the empirical analysis, using paired comparisons. The conclusion summarizes the findings and discusses them in relation to broader notions of effectiveness.
Theory and Case Selection
Assuming task complexity and limited statehood, this paper makes two arguments with respect to effective service provision by MNCs. Firstly, we make the case for an important aspect of legitimacy: the congruence of norms held by those domestic actors and entities that must be coordinated to deliver services, with the international norms on the basis of which MNCs act (Krasner and Risse 2012) .
ii By norms we understand shared understandings of appropriate behavior (March and Olson 1989) . In complex task areas -that is, when service provision requires reiterated coordination of the MNC with a number of domestic actorsthis kind of legitimacy is a necessary condition for service provision.
Why is norm-conformity and, in the negative case non-conformity, important for effective contributions to public goods provision by firms? Our argument assumes that actors' interests are constituted by norms and beliefs March and Olsen 1989) . High levels of norm-conformity thus increase the chance that the preferences of actors (MNCs on the one hand, and domestic coordination partners on the other) converge, which in turn keeps coordination costs low and minimizes the risk of coordination failure.
iii If the international norms on which firm programs are built resonate well with domestic norms and beliefs, domestic actors will thus cooperate with firms to provide a public service (Checkel 1999; Cortell and Davis 2000) . iv The reverse logic applies: legitimacy is lacking when the norms and beliefs held by coordination partners clash with the international standards on which MNCs build their approach to service provision. Concomitant of such a clash of norms and beliefs is accordingly a high probability of conflicts of interest between the MNC and coordination partners. Thus, with decreasing legitimacy, the costs of coordination increase, and so does the likeliness of coordination failure. v Entirely illegitimate attempts by firms to provide for services will therefore not be effective.
We argue furthermore that norms, and their convergence or divergence, are also important once actors have defined their interests. Norms then still define and constrain the set of choices and strategies available to actors, and allow them to justify their actions. vi In particular when attempts by corporations to provide services are considered illegitimate, domestic actors can take recourse to competing normative claims in order to justify publicly and vis-à-vis the MNC their denial of cooperation (see Jetschke 2011) . In consequence, domestic actors will behave non-cooperatively. Service provision will fail.
While these aspects of norm-congruence and non-congruence make legitimacy a necessary condition of successful service provision, institutional design is also important. This paper argues therefore, secondly, that the degree of institutionalization of the agreement between different actors that together deliver a service explains different degrees of effectiveness.
With respect to institutionalization, we look at organizational structures that provide for monitoring and incentives for the achievement of program goals. The paper also considers the degree to which these goals are formulated concisely and obligatory. Agreements are highly institutionalized if they are based on precise language as concerns who has to do what, how, and when, which is in addition to that obligatory and supported by the right incentives and the possibility to detect deviant behavior (Abbott et al. 2000; Crawford and Ostrom 1995; Keohane 1989) . High degrees of institutionalization will reduce uncertainties of actors concerning the behavior that is expected from them, and how others will behave. High degrees of institutionalization also increase the level of information actors have about their mutual behavior, and so enable ad hoc functional adaptation, and mitigate free rider problems. Therefore, high degrees of institutionalization result in effective service provision.
We assess our arguments on effectiveness in pair-wise comparisons. For each argument, we select cases that illustrate variation of the explanatory factor (legitimacy, institutional design) in order to assess the effects this variation has on service provision. Freeport MacMoRan and Anvil Mining -make attempts to improve public security provision in these contexts. These attempts vary in how effective they are. We argue in the following sections that these differences bore down to legitimacy and institutionalization.
Legitimacy: A Necessary Condition for Service Provision?
We will now examine our argument as concerns legitimacy empirically: a minimum of congruence of normative beliefs held by those actors and entities that must be coordinated to deliver services, with the international norms on the basis of which MNCs act, is a precondition for effectiveness. The analysis considers this argument by looking at two cases of firms in the South African car industry trying to provide HIV/AIDS-related medical services: Mercedes Benz in East London and a Japanese multinational car firm vii in Durban.
The two cases illustrate different levels of legitimacy. We show that on account of these differences in legitimacy, one attempt to provide services failed, whereas the other was relatively effective. We then discuss the potential for generalization of our argument by looking at two cases from the mining industry and the field of security provision in the DRC and South Africa.
Multinational Car Firms and the Fight against HIV/AIDS in South Africa
In the area of HIV/AIDS the activities of firms are based on a relatively unified transnational norm (WHO 1999 (WHO -2008 
MNCs and Security Provision in the DRC and South Africa
We will now examine two cases in which mining firms sought to contribute to public security provision. The first case features firms in the DRC and their attempts to contribute to collective security, which the government does not regard as legitimate. The second case concerns South Africa, where the government appreciates such attempts. The analysis demonstrates that the corresponding differences in norm-congruence cause variation in program outcomes: whereas the company initiative in the DRC was not even started, the company programs in South Africa have been relatively successful.
Competing Norms: Attempts to Improve Public Security in the DRC Our first case features Anvil Mining and its attempt to improve security in the DRC in 2007-8 by providing human rights training to the Congolese police and military. This attempt was met with hostility by the Congolese government on account of lack of legitimacy.
To improve security in the DRC, Anvil Mining offered training programs to local Congolese police and military forces on non-violent policing methods and human rights. These offers followed international norms as outlined in the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPs). The VPs stipulate that companies should promote human rights and to this end engage with domestic security forces through such trainings . The
Congolese government, however, insisted on a different approach to public security. It repeatedly stated that security is the prerogative of the state, thereby also referring to an international norm: the norm on state sovereignty and national security (Interview 7 NGO; Interview 8 and 9 Police). What were the consequences of this incongruence of norms for Anvil's attempt to train state security forces?
The firm offered repeatedly to train Congolese police and military forces. Yet the government proclaimed that mining firms should by no means become involved in training state security forces. As a consequence of this competing normative stance, Anvil was not allowed to provide comprehensive training to police forces, as it had wished for (Interview 10 and 11 Business). It was granted instead only a two hour-long briefing on preventive security measures and the importance of human rights with the commander in chief of the local police. This commander would then decide by himself whether he would integrate what he had heard before into police training and practice. Hence, Anvil's initiative was not a total failure -at least not on paper. However, this procedure rendered the firm's attempt to improve the provision of security services ineffective: unsurprisingly, the commander in chief did not implement any of the VPs norms in the procedures of his police forces (Interview 11 and 12 Business; Interview 13 NGO; Interview 8 and 14 Police). So in practice, the program failed. This case thus demonstrates our argument, which is that service provision in complex task areas will be ineffective if legitimacy is lacking.
Congruence of Norms: Business Initiatives in South Africa
In contrast to the DRC, the South African government calls on the private sector to help improve public security provision (Shearing and Berg 2006; Singh 2008 (Nzimande 2008 ). Some of these businesses embrace the VPs. Hence, the domestic norms on which is based how the government wants to improve security provision and the norms on which firms base their attempts to improve security provision, are congruent. The government perceives business contributions to public security as legitimate.
In consequence, company programs that contribute to security proliferate, and are often institutionalization. We will in addition to that look at four cases of security provision of mining companies in the DRC.
The Provision of HIV/AIDS-related Health Services in the South African Car

Industry: Institutionalization as a Key Factor for Effectiveness
The fight against HIV/AIDS of multinational car firms involves extensive and reiterated coordination in three distinct institutional contexts. Firms, firstly, coordinate intraorganizationally in order to run workplace programs. Secondly, they coordinate suppliers and assist them to implement workplace programs, too. In addition, they coordinate in a non- Interview 10, 11, 12 Business). There are, however, no precisely defined goals to which actors are committed. The meetings of the security forum, for instance, take place on the basis of rather general statements of intention to improve public security in the area (Interview 7 NGO;
Interview 25 Business). The initiatives also lacked institutionalization, despite the fact that diverse actors needed to be coordinated. Anvil Mining and Freeport were thus confined to diplomacy for making other actors take part and effectively work towards the initiatives' goals.
How does this low degree of institutionalization affect the effectiveness of these initiatives?
There are regular meetings of the Katanga Security Forum. Yet while information was exchanged, more specific initiatives for improved public security did not follow from these meetings (Interview 26 NGO). As concerns the conflict prevention program with artisanal miners in Kolwezi, the project goal of developing an integrated approach to resolve the violent conflicts between artisanal miners and industrial mining companies was not achieved. One of the problems was that the government did not put in place sufficient Artisanal Mining Zones, in which artisanal mining would be legal. While the initiative had identified this as a crucial step towards reducing conflict, little progress was made (International Alert 2010). The companies had no sanctioning authority in order to enforce the agreement and make the government deliver. Hence, despite the fact that Anvil Mining and Freeport sought to prevent conflicts and provide more security in the wider area through these programs, they remained ineffective on account of a low degree of institutionalization.
In sum, the mining cases confirm the findings from the automotive industry: high degrees of institutionalization make companies' workplace programs more efficacious. Public outreach programs by firms -which are in general less institutionalized -turn out to be less efficacious.
Conclusion
This paper considered an unlikely external actor as provider of vital services in areas of limited statehood: MNCs. It focused on firms that are motivated to provide services and examined under which conditions their attempts in this respect are effective. We analyzed HIV/AIDSrelated health care and security service provision programs. Both are complex task areas and, thus, hard cases for effective contributions to service provision by firms. The paper showed that MNCs contribute effectively to service provision under condition of two factors:
legitimacy and degree of institutionalization. Firstly, legitimacy is a necessary condition for effective service provision. The paper showed that the norms on which service provision programs are based must be congruent with domestic norms in order to be effective. Secondly, institutionalization is an important predictor for effectiveness once legitimacy is given. Our analysis demonstrates that the two factors explain effective service provision by MNCs in sectors as different as the mining and the automotive industries, in issue areas as distinct as HIV/AIDS and security, and in countries as divergent as South Africa and the DRC. Hence, we conclude that they are generally relevant.
The paper analyzed effectiveness in term of efficacy, that is, effective implementation of policy programs. However, it also provides insights about the contribution of these programs to general service provision. Our findings indicate that the firm activities substantially contribute to general service provision. In the context of the workplace and supply chain program of Mercedes, for example, about 60.000 persons gain access to free health care services. The other multinationals in the car industry in South Africa have similar programs. Our findings thus indicate that the level of services provided in those areas of limited statehood in which MNCs make attempts to contribute to service provision will be higher than in areas without foreign firms -or in which MNCs do not make such attempts.
However, we should also highlight the limitations of effective service provision by MNCs. We found that the effectiveness of program implementation at the workplace is negatively related to the scope of programs. Workplace health and security programs, which are narrow in scope, are highly institutionalized and therefore effective. In contrast, programs that aim at improving the fight against HIV/AIDS or public security in society in general are broader in scope, yet not highly institutionalized and therefore not very effective.
Service provision by MNCs is also not entirely unproblematic. Their inclusiveness is limited, and this sometimes increases inequality. The South African support program for local police stations, for instance, is mainly implemented in areas in which the main sponsoring firms of this program are located (Interview 15 Business). A manager of the program says that he had to make sure that the donations made by firms were spent in their direct vicinity (Interview 27 Business). Service delivery by firms may thus give rise to a fragmented and selective distribution of security. Furthermore, when MNCs step up to provide public services in areas of limited statehood, this may have unintended consequences (Hönke, with Thomas 2012) .
Non-state governance may for instance reduce rather than improve the ability of the state to provide services. Instead of complementing the state, service provision by multinationals may hence rather substitute for it (Cammett and MacLean 2011; Hönke 2010) . These additional considerations are important beyond the focus of this paper on MNCs. They apply to external actors in areas of limited statehood in general, including NGOs, development agencies, international organizations, and other actors discussed in the contributions of this special issue.
